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Working in Coalition, and Wall-to-Wall:
The New Progressive Normal
Gary Rhoades1

Underlying this essay are three observations and corresponding suggestions. First, as the
U.S. starts to come out of the pandemic, public declamations about and private deliberations
within colleges and universities are framed in part by negotiating getting back to some form of
“normal.” At the center of and delimiting these labor/management negotiations is an all-toofamiliar master narrative articulated by management invoking a “new normal,” a time of
conditions and challenges borne of, transmitted by, and/or accelerated and amplified due to
Covid-19. Yet, I suggest that yet another iteration of disaster/disastrous academic capitalism is
neither called for nor does it offer a compelling future for higher education.
Second, there is a counter-narrative articulated by some in the media, scholars, activist
groups, and labor that the pre-pandemic “normal” was deeply problematic due to systemic and
enduring patterns of disinvestment and of racial and other inequities. The premise and promise is
that we need to get to better than the preceding normal. To the end of progress being made in that
direction, I note some important markers in broader public discourse and policy as well as in
locally negotiated collective bargaining agreements.
Third, there has been an increasingly expansive pattern of academic employees working
coalition within and beyond the academy’s walls, even forming “wall-to-wall units.” In what
could be framed as a “new progressive normal,” community and broader social concerns are
becoming increasingly centered in organizing and contract campaigns. I suggest that therein lies
the best future not only for academic labor but also relatedly for fulfilling academic institutions’
public missions and securing greater public support for higher education.
The generative and collective source of my thinking here lies in my national and local
study and experience of the academic labor movement. It also lies in studied and experienced
patterns in academic management at departmental, institutional, system/statewide, and national
levels. To convey the key themes borne of this study and experience, I offer selected, specific
stories to flesh out the larger narrative, in some cases weaving in stories of my own university.
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A New Normal: Beyond Disaster/Disastrous Academic Capitalism
In April 2020, the University of Arizona’s (UofAZ) president announced the first and most
extreme university-wide furlough program of any peer university in the country. The program
was said to be necessary and prudent in the face of a projected budget deficit. Ensuing months
witnessed many other universities and colleges announcing layoffs and furloughs, such that The
Chronicle of Higher Education tracked them in a database (CHE, 2020). However, most of
Arizona’s peer institutions did not implement university-wide furloughs, and those that did set
them at much lower levels than UAZ’s 4-7 weeks (versus at the University of Wisconsin,
Madison, it was 4-9 days). Moreover, at some prominent, peer institutions that were unionized,
such as the University of Oregon and Rutgers University, the claims of financial crisis were
challenged by academic employees. So, too, one with a “minority union,” United Campus
Workers, Georgia, rescinded the furloughs it had announced in the late Spring. Still, layoffs and
non-renewals were implemented at unprecedented levels at campuses nationwide.
The most hard-hit places were small, non-selective private and regional public institutions
and systems, (at community colleges, in which nationally nearly three-quarters of faculty are
contingent, the brunt of faculty reductions fell on adjunct faculty, whose numbers were reduced
through non-renewals rather than layoffs). Even in the above settings, though, with some major
exceptions, what was more at play than actual financial exigency was, in my words, “disaster
academic capitalism” (Flaherty, 2020). Combining the ideas of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007)
and academic capitalism (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004), by that I mean, managers using the crisis
to “amplify restructuring” that was already underway, invoking Covid recession as a rationale
“to restructure and retrench with management trying to bypass deliberative, strategic, shared
governance” (Flaherty, 2020).
Notably, a year later, an assessment of the pandemic’s impact on universities and colleges
was entitled, “Why doomsday hasn’t happened” (Gardner, 2021). As the article’s subtitle read,
“Most colleges averted financial disaster; But the pandemic will still have a lasting impact.” For
most, then, the sky did not fall, notwithstanding the widespread managerial projections of
massive budget shortfalls and unparalleled financial stress. In a lesson that many bargaining units
of academic employees learned many years ago, there is a world of difference between
managers’ budget projections of crisis, and the actual financial health of institutions, identified
more accurately in the years-long pattern of their independently, externally audited
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports. The former may be constructed and invoked by
managers to justify all manner of measures, from furloughs to layoffs, retrenchment, and
restructuring. That is the modus operandi of disaster academic capitalism, capitalizing on a
combination of a perceived, projected, and partly real crises to amplify pre-existing plans and
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patterns of resource allocation, justified as prudent and necessary for the institution to survive.
Notably, for example, at the UofAZ the level of the furloughs was cut in half in October, though
it still remained the highest among peer universities. And somehow, amidst it all, college
athletics continued to be subsidized, remain intact, and new coaches as well as new central
administrators continued to be hired, and bonuses paid.
For some systems and institutions, the crisis which the pandemic/recession catalyzed was
more serious and substantial. In some of the most prominent of those cases, it was borne in large
part of a combination of managerial choices made for over decade along with ongoing state
disinvestment in public higher education. There, the pattern could partly be called the product of
“disastrous academic capitalism,” of administrators trying to play a losing game they had little
chance of winning—investing at imprudent levels in facilities (and increasing debt load
accordingly) to attract wealthier and Whiter out-of-state students (Salazar, Jaquette, & Han,
forthcoming). Although they built new dorms, recreation centers, and other fancy facilities to
attract such students, participating in a frenzied arms race of facilities, the (out-of-state) students
did not come. Combine that with ongoing state disinvestment and state imposed limits on tuition
increases, and you get a managerially made disaster.
At a system level, arguably no more significant case of manmade disastrous, disaster
academic capitalism can be found than in the Pennsylvania’s State System of Higher Education
(PASSHE) 14 regional public universities. A major “redesign” plan of the current system
leadership, overwhelmingly opposed by the faculty, has been proposed that would merge two
sets of three universities each, reducing the number in the system from 14 to 10. It is projected to
save $18.4M after five years, which for a system PASSHE’s size is very little (Snyder, 2021)—
and there is ample reason to be healthily skeptical about such savings, as with projected losses,
given the history of mergers and costs. Moreover, for all the claims of sustainability, the
discourse about sustainability and paving the way for the future is far more developed than any
detailed analyses and plans as to whether and how the mergers will preserve, let alone enhance
the academic opportunities offered by the institutions to students in rural, lower income areas, as
well as contribute to the economic vitality of the regions in which they are keystone to the local
economies. Rather, the vision is rather a narrow one of students facing increased costs and debt
loads, and universities facing continued austerity from a state insufficiently committed to
supporting either/both college opportunity or quality.
The proverbial plate for the current system chancellor and the faculty union (APSCUF—
Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties) was set by management
decisions of previous administrations, as well as by state disinvestment that have contributed to
increased debt load and decreased student enrollment. Notably, a RAND study commissioned by
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the state’s Legislative Budget and Finance Committee largely overlooked that history in
suggesting five options for “Promoting the long-term sustainability and viability of the
universities in the system” (Seltzer, 2018). Having been interviewed by members of the RAND
team for that study, I am both disappointed and unsurprised: One of my observations about the
system was that for many years institutions had been seeking to increase out-of-state student
recruitment by investing in facilities, a game they seemed destined to lose (indeed, out-of-state
enrollments remained minimal (~11%) throughout the 2000s). One team member acknowledged
that indeed, debt service on such facilities was a problem for many campuses in the system. But
the lead person was far more interested in laying the blame for financial problems on the
“restrictions” of the collective bargaining agreement, a claim that in reviewing APSCUF’s
contract relative to other comparable ones I pointed out simply was not true (it is a strong
contract, but would not, with consultation prevent restructuring). What was, true, though, was the
state’s systematic disinvestment in PASSHE, which rather undermined the legislature’s alleged
goal of “long-term sustainability and viability.” As the APSCUF president at the time pointed
out, the state was 47th n the country in per capita support for higher education (Mash, 2018), As
for enrollment trends, the noted decline was less an inexorable function of demographic trends
than of strategically misplaced investment and of missed opportunities in serving transfer and
adult student markets, or tapping into emerging professional Masters degree markets, all of
which remained basically stable in the 2000s, and none of which would have involved the overinvestment in residence halls and facilities (PASSHE, 2021).
At the institutional level, arguably no more publicized, prominent case of manmade
disastrous, disaster academic capitalism, and of accompanying management/labor dispute can be
found than the University of Akron. The administration’s announcement in July 2020 of layoffs
of 96 and 82 staff and contract professionals (McClean, 2020) generated immediate faculty union
resistance, followed by mediation (which ruled that the university had the right to invoke the
“force majeure” clause in the contract—contract language matters). In March, the faculty signed
a new three-year collective bargaining agreement and three-year contract extension, which
included a small pay cut, the provision of bonuses if certain enrollment targets were hit, and a
one-time $3,000 bonus to faculty for having shifted online during the pandemic. Ultimately, 80
full-time faculty were laid off, with no calculation of the number of adjunct faculty who were
non-renewed—part-time faculty do not have collective bargaining rights in Ohio, and are not
included in the unit (Goist, 2021).
The parallels with PASSHE are striking in terms of what led up to the hotly contested
situation in the Summer/Fall of 2020. For over a decade, the University of Akron had
aggressively invested in the amenities (and athletics) arms race (Stripling, 2017). Having visited
the campus in 2010 to meet with the AAUP bargaining unit, I was struck by the largely unused
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lazy river in the $17M student union, the construction of expensive new residence halls (to
attract out-of-state students), and the very expensive investment in football and soccer facilities.
Such investments were combined with roughly a $23M/year subsidy from the main campus to
athletics, in a university with a 39% graduation rate at the time (Exner, 2019). With all due
respect to the glory days of Akron as a producer of zippers and the resultant “mascot” of the
university, the result of these initiatives has been basically zip (in attracting out-of-state students
as well as in developing revenue generating teams). And, so, too, with other entrepreneurial
ventures. During my visit, I stayed in a cylindrically shaped hotel in “Quaker Square” (which
was a former silo in a Quaker Oats mill). In another disastrous academic capitalist initiative that
failed, Quaker Square had been purchased by the university in 2007, much of which was later
sold off. with the hotel being converted to a residence hall.
Nevertheless, for all of these managerial missteps, and notwithstanding the projections of
financial crisis, by 2021, “the board of trustees approved a revised budget that forecasts a
surplus at the end of the fiscal year of about $19.6 million.” (Goist, 2021) As suggested, the
gap between projected losses and the real financial condition of the institution is a common
characteristic of disaster academic capitalism, restructuring under cover of Covid. And as in
the case of PASSHE, the vision for the future is neither clear nor bright.
The Old Normal: Beyond the Preceding Normal
A significant counter-narrative has emerged in response to the pandemic, and to the
prognostications about the post-pandemic world. It has centered on pre-pandemic “old normal”
of systemic inequities that were being further heightened with Covid-19, such that “getting back
to normal” was a profoundly problematic goal. More than ever, goes the storyline, the pandemic
has made it more clear than ever that systemic inequities need to be redressed. According to
those articulating some variation of this counter-narrative, the goal must be to move beyond the
preceding, inequitable, (as Charles Toombs, President of the California Faculty Association
phrased it on a recent National Center panel) ugly normal. That has include addressing inequities
amidst the pandemic.
Within higher education, activists and unions sounded forewarnings early on about the
pandemic/recession’s disparate impacts on employees and students (as on larger communities in
society). For example, some provided recommendations on how to support women and faculty of
color, exhorting institutions to “not let go” of diversity amidst cuts (Gonzales & Griffin, 2020).
Others produced reports and recommendations about food insecurity, and what universities
should do to support students (Goldrick-Rab, 2020). In the case of the latter, the Hope Center not
only targeted university administrations for taking action, but also has worked with the Temple
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Association of University Professions to establish, generate, and administer a student emergency
aid fund. In both cases, the scholars/activists were addressing phenomena that pre-dated the
pandemic, and they were leveraging the surfaced and heightened awareness brought about by the
pandemic to make recommendations for moving beyond the bad old normal days.
Although it was almost immediately evident that the pandemic and recession were
disproportionately hitting marginalized populations of students and campus employees, for the
most part, university and college administrations responded to that challenge with statements
(important exceptions can particularly be found among some community colleges—Wang,
2020). It cannot be said that higher education’s formal leaders have been leaders in mobilizing
collective, ameliorative national and/or statewide responses to mitigate systemic inequities.
Certainly, at individual institutions there were some efforts in some cases to mitigate the effects
of the pandemic on students generally, with emergency aid and other measures. Certainly, as
well, in research universities there was mobilization around developing (and then in the Fall of
2020) delivering vaccines. But most commonly, institutional managers responded with financial
mitigation measures that tended to prioritize the institution’s medium to long-term financial
needs over the immediate financial and employment needs of employees and students (though
sometimes, in conjunction with employee unions, as at Rutgers, layoffs were coordinated with
unemployment insurance benefits to help support laid off employees). And, managers responded
with statements that invoked various tropes about family, shared sacrifice, and being in this
together, even as they implemented measures to layoff and non-renew staff.
Much scholarship has previously spoken to the “non-performative” nature of too many
such university statements expressing concerns about particular and particularly charged matters
(Ahmed, 2012; Hypolite & Stewart, 2019; Squire, Nicolazzo, & Perez, 2019). Such statements
often “absorb” the particular needs of disparately impacted marginalized populations under an
overgeneralized umbrella discourse equivalent to saying “all lives matter,” as well as with a
discourse that foregrounds the needs of “the organization.” And such statements often as well not
only fail to specify concrete actions to redress the situation, they also undercut/delimit
substantive action as not legal or practical. An analysis of presidential statements of compassion
about the pandemic (from a sample of research universities) corroborates such a reading, as the
statements analyzed from March 2020 to March 2021 repeatedly invoked and spoke to the needs
and future of “the organization,” far more than to the immediate and medium-term needs of the
employees and students within it (Mars, Rhoades, & Thorp, undated).
Of course, notwithstanding pronouncements to the contrary, we are NOT all in this together
in colleges and universities. And obviously, we are not in the situation equally, with equivalent
sets of resources, supports, and potential for recovery. Nor are we all getting through this
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equally. Indeed, the pattern of job losses starkly clarified who was disproportionately bearing the
brunt of higher education’s financial stress. One Fall 2020 analysis concluded that job losses in
the academy, “mirrored historic losses on the national level,” (Bauman, 2020) analogizing the
pattern to the findings of an analysis in The Washington Post that the “pandemic-inspired
economic crisis may be the most unequal in history,” with youth, women, and workers of color.
(Long, Van Dam, Fowers, & Shapiro, 2020). A subsequent Chronicle article’s title told the story,
“The lowest-paid workers in higher education are suffering the highest job losses.” (DouglasGabriel & Fowers, 2021).
Recognition of such inequities underlay much activism. For example, within weeks of the
UofAZ’s furlough announcement an activist group, Coalition for Academic Justice, University
of Arizona (CAJUA), was formed. As a coalition of faculty, staff, and graduate employees, it
was the eventual progenitor of a wall-to-wall union discussed below, United Campus Workers,
Arizona (UCWA). Although financial matters were the spark, the animating focus was on
(in)justice, embodied in the university’s furlough plan. As CAJUA set forth in its “Alternate
Furlough Plan,” the university’s plan protected the most privileged by having a cap of $200K on
the furlough rates. The activists’ plan called for a higher cap, centered its call for greater cuts to
be taken by central administrators, and suggested a salary floor ($70K) and a progressive scale
that would protect lower-paid workers. On the latter two proposals, CAJUA realized some
success (e.g., a floor of $45K was established, as was a somewhat more progressive scale). As an
indicator of CAJUA’s justice orientation, many of the early activists had been involved in
protests surrounding campus policing of students of color, and much of their eventual focus on
financial matters was tracking and reversing non-renewals of contract faculty and graduate
employees.
Concerns about who was being disproportionately cut also emerged among existing
bargaining units. Two examples exemplify that pattern. At the University of Oregon, the United
Academics union, which includes tenure-stream and non-tenure-track faculty (as well as
postdocs) responded to the administration’s proposed furloughs and layoffs by providing
alternative proposals in which the tenure-track faculty would carry a disproportionate burden of
the furloughs relative to career-track faculty (UAUO, 2020). At the University of Illinois,
Chicago, where the tenure-track and non-tenure-track bargaining units were separate, but where
they maintained an ongoing, supportive relationship, part of the push of the tenure-track unit was
to reappoint contingent faculty who had been “let go prematurely” (UICUF, 2020). Moreover,
the tenure-track unit advocated for greater access to PPE for unionized custodial workers. Such
solidarity with staff was in evidence in other faculty bargaining units nationally as well. And in
places it translated into reframing who “essential workers” are at colleges, which played out
advocacy about provision for protective equipment as well as priority in vaccination.
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Beyond this sort of solidarity with laid off and other workers, a central part of what gave
life to counter-narratives in the academy and academic organizing were broader social
movements of the day (e.g., #MeToo, #BLM) that were also playing out in academe. That can be
seen in the advocacy campaigns of many academic bargaining units calling for an active
reckoning with and redressing of raced/gendered/classed systemic inequities in their institutions.
It can also be seen in contract campaigns of academic bargaining units. Thus, recognition of the
inadequacy of previous mechanisms in universities for handling sexual harassment, (gender and
race-based) discrimination, and treatment of international students/employees, has translated into
in a number of cases contract demands by local bargaining units. That has been much in
evidence in New York City most recently, with the contract demands of the Columbia
Postdoctoral Workers, the Columbia Graduate Workers, and The NYU Graduate Student
Organizing Committee. For each of these units, one of their central demands was for
strengthened, and external, independent arbitration on harassment. Such social justice matters,
including about child care and about international workers, were foregrounded alongside other
more longstanding, conventional job security and financial issues of salaries and benefits.
Academic employees, then, are laying the foundation for developing processes and steps
for undertaking a serious racial reckoning in the academy, as well as a reckoning about sexual
harassment/misconduct and gendered structures. Such efforts can be grounded in collective
bargaining agreements, but also in larger ways the move beyond the bargaining table.
Working in Coalition, and Wall-To-Wall: The Progressive New Normal
For some time, the smartest and most progressive locals of academic employees have
understood and acted on the importance of working in coalition, on and off campus. That model
has played out in distinctive ways and contexts. For the California Faculty Association, that has
meant a combination of working with local labor councils in the metro areas of campuses, with
outside academic advocacy groups such as the California Part-time Faculty Association, as well
as developing a strong program for engaging and working with undergraduate students (Hoffman
& Hess, 2014). In the case of the Professional Staff Congress it has entailed an “industrial union”
model of including multiple categories of workers within the union (Negri, 2018). In the case of
the United University Professions it has entailed mobilizing contract and political campaigns
with various statewide and local labor and community groups. For Rutgers AAUP/AFT, it is
rooted in a coalition of academic unions (each with different contracts but much coordination),
and a broader coalition beyond campus called Rutgers One, embodied in an historic hall (part of
the Labor Studies and Employment Relations department) at which I spoke in 2009, filled with
the union flags of locals throughout the state.
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Each of the above locals has in different ways and to different degrees foregrounded not
only the systemic racism that needs to be redressed, but also the related structural deficit in the
support of public higher education. Within the faculty ranks, that plays out in the growing
proportions of adjunct and full-time contingent faculty, particularly in postsecondary education
institutions with most first generation, working-class, and BIPOC student populations (most
obviously in community colleges but also in regional public universities). The California Faculty
Association’s report, Equity Interrupted (2017), made this connection particularly clear, detailing
how in California as the numbers and proportions of students of color increased in the California
State University system, the per capita state support for that system declined (CFA, 2017). Better
supporting those students must involve better support the faculty and staff who educate them, for
these employees’ working conditions shape students’ experiences and opportunities. Nowhere is
that clearer, and more clearly advanced by academic labor than in the case of adjunct faculty
(Maisto, 2012; Rhoades, 2020).
Just a decade ago, the importance of such coalitions for academic labor arguably became
more clear than ever. At the time, I was General Secretary of the American Association of
University Professors, and Ohio’s governor, John Kasich, had signed a “right to work” bill, SB 5,
that hamstrung public sector collective bargaining in several ways, and that also targeted higher
education faculty’s rights, effectively eliminating them if faculty were involved in shared
governance. Notably, after the previously successful assault on public sector collective
bargaining rights in Wisconsin, there was not much of a learning curve on the part of those in
Ohio drafting the legislation, and a very important mobilizing benefit of that previous fight for
labor. In Ohio, in contrast to Wisconsin’s law, firefighters and police were not exempted from
the new law in Ohio (McNay, 2013). Two memories stand out for me regarding the nature and
value of worker coalitions. First is one of standing outside the statehouse in Columbus at a rally
with masses of public sector workers, including a sizeable contingent of faculty (Ohio was one of
the two largest states of AAUP collective bargaining members), and at their appearance
experiencing the re-energizing power of the firefighters showing up, in full uniform, in a
marching band, loudly, proudly, and strongly demonstrating solidarity. The second one is of a
question that leaders of other unions asked one of the AAUP faculty leaders in the committee
work and mobilization leading up to the successful referendum challenge that repealed SB5 with
over 61% voting to repeal the legislation—“Why are they coming after you [the faculty] so
specifically?” (The faculty later found out that a central group of university presidents were the
originators of that particular section of the legislation.) Although other unions in Ohio were
much more powerful than all the faculty unions combined, faculty leaders were welcomed and
played important roles in working and testifying against the legislation. Coalitions matter (which
sadly, the full-time faculty units in Ohio seem not to have fully internalized and learned with
regard to advocating with and for part-time faculty members’ collective bargaining rights).
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Over time, that understanding has moved closer to the center of organizing in academe. It
particularly has been taken up and advanced by categories of academic employees once on the
margins of academe, and academic labor, who are now in the vanguard of the latter (Rhoades,
forthcoming). From the start, that has been evident in the organizing of contingent faculty. From
the metro campaign of SEIU Local 500 at George Washington University, the first major success
of an adjunct-only campaign in a major private university, the coalition building with students
and other groups, for example, was evident (Berry & Worthen, 2018; Rhoades, 2013).
Subsequently, at the Georgetown campaign that student connection was all the more important,
in the foundation laid by them in establishing a Just Employment Policy for custodial campus
workers (Wertsch & McCratin, 2018). Later still, various Faculty Forward campaigns were
informed by “Fight for $15 campaigns linking contingent faculty to low-wage workers in the
local economy (Rhoades, forthcoming). And the contingent faculty movement generally was
shaped and strengthened by an inside/outside strategy of activists working within various unions
and advocacy organizations (Berry, 2005; Rhoades, forthcoming). It has been informed as well
by the powerful, mobilizing mantra that, “Faculty’s working conditions are students’ learning
conditions” (Maisto, 2012), a mantra that, as is so critical for public sector unions, mobilizes
larger public support by connecting workers’ interests to larger public interests (Johnston, 1994).
As noted at the end of the last section, graduate and postdoc employees have consistently
taken the coalition work to even another level. That has meant actively campaigning about and
centering in contract campaigns various social justice concerns linked to larger social movements
and policy contexts (e.g., xenophobic nationalism). For these categories of employees, these
community-based concerns are arguably part of a larger inflection point within the labor
movement, as perhaps in society.
At a more local, and personally experienced level, the increasingly expansive and inclusive
character of the academic labor movement nationally is evident in the birthing of an activist
social justice coalition and then wall-to-wall union local of UCWA, Local 7065 of the
Communications Workers of America. As discussed above, the UofAZ’s furlough plan,
announced April 17, 2020, triggered the establishment of CAJUA. Just four months later, August
18, 2020, a wall-to-wall “minority union” (without collective bargaining rights) was formed,
UCWA, Local 7065 of the Communications Workers of America. The union includes all
categories of faculty, staff, and student employees. It is not bound by “community of interest”
restrictions often guiding public employment relations board decisions about configuration of the
unit. Similar UCW’s are found in Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and indeed throughout the
south (https://www.unitedcampusworkers.org). Some, as in Tennessee, date back two decades.
Arizona’s is the most recent, but UCW Colorado was established in 2020 as well (it was
grounded in a more longstanding graduate student organization).
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Across the above “wall-to-wall” settings, there is much diversity in the driving issues
underlying and undertaken by the locals. Yet, there are common themes, dating as far back as
UCW Tennessee’s “living wage” campaign in 2000, kicked off with a “Labor rights are human
rights” event (https://www.ucw-cwa.org/history). Overwhelmingly, the activism is driven by
intersecting economic, workplace, social justice issues, foregrounding institutions’ most
vulnerable workers and students. The wall-to-wall membership of the locals helps shape that
collective orientation
Such themes were evident as well in the case of CAJUA, which preceded UCWA, even
though the plurality of members in the activist group and originally in the union were tenurestream faculty. Beyond those financial issues, matters of campus health and safety amidst Covid
were drivers as well, and underlay the establishment of a chapter at Arizona State University,
which had been preceded by a “Community Care Coalition” working not only for a safe
workplace, but equally importantly, as in the name, for policies that would ensure care for the
communities in which ASU’s campuses were situated. That care was derived from an
understanding that the lowest paid employees of the university were being left particularly
vulnerable in the pandemic, without adequate support, protection, and pay. It also was derived
from an understanding that employees and students moved back and forth between campus and
community in a fluid process that threatened to contribute to community spread. Indeed, a
January 2021 study found that the UofAZ had the dubious distinction of being a leading campus
in the country in terms of contributing to community spread (Burke, 2021).
Another major issue that gave rise to UCWA was the UofAZ’s “deal” with then for-profit
Ashford University and its private OPM services provider, Zovio (McKenzie, 2020). The
backlash triggered by the announcement, which was undertaken without meaningful shared
governance, led to an overwhelming vote of opposition to the deal, and the formation of a
Faculty Senate advisory committee that developed recommendations for mitigating issues related
to the arrangement. Beyond the lack of shared governance and the financial prudence of the deal,
judged by many business school faculty to be a “lemon,” at the heart of the outcry was criticism
of the arrangement with a for-profit provider, essentially selling them the university’s name for
an upfront payout and possible ongoing marginal revenues, as an abrogation of Arizona’s land
grant mission. Managerial claims that the arrangement would enhance and serve diverse student
populations were anything but supported by Ashford and Zovio’s records of problematic student
outcomes (leading to a Notice of Concern from the accrediting body, as well as lawsuits). To
most faculty, staff, and students who articulated their views, the arrangement was viewed as
deeply problematic. It was what I would call yet another case of disastrous academic capitalism.

Published by The Keep, 2021

11

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 4

Part of the critique of the Ashford arrangement is related to a critique of corporatization
and privatization in higher education. The concern of many is that such deals are pitched by
managers as benefitting “the organization” or “the enterprise,” and yet can have serious adverse
consequences for communities in which universities are situated and are charged to serve. To
return to the system redesign proposed in Pennsylvania, such concern about adverse impact
underlies not just the response of the faculty and their union. It is clear that some state legislators
are concerned about the adverse impact of the redesign for the communities in which the
“merged” campuses are located and perhaps programs are downsized. Those concerns are
amplified by the working-class nature of the communities involved (Schackner, 2021). And they
are partly borne of internal-to-the-university processes that insufficiently draw on community
members and partners, and that fail to conduct sufficient economic impact studies of how
universities’ decisions impact local populations and economies.
In such concern about supporting local communities and economies, academic labor is in
solidarity with broader labor groups in wanting to increase public investment in higher
education. Both want to break the ongoing cycle of public disinvestment. Labor cares about the
opportunities that higher education can afford the children of labor. As one academic union
leader (Elizabeth Hoffman, of the California Faculty Association, now retired) related to me
about a meeting with a local labor council many years ago, some of her colleagues were
surprised by how much members of the local labor council seemed to “care” about the situation
of (in this case) university faculty. Her response to them was, “They don’t care about you, they
care about the opportunity that the university education that we conduct can provide for them
and their children.” At UCWA, we are hearing much the same from local labor leaders, who are
excited about the formation of a workers union at the university. They, as much as we campus
workers, seek to enhance access to affordable, quality higher education that prioritizes and serves
local and state communities, not just the prestige and financial interests of “the university.”
Indeed, the local is currently developing a “workers’ budget” proposal that foregrounds precisely
these priorities.
The wall-to-wall configuration of the UCWs, then, inclusive of all categories of campus
workers, is emblematic of the increasing commitment on the part of groups of academic
employees to work in coalition with other employees and groups on campus and beyond. It also
embodies the larger trend of academic employees and bargaining units increasingly centering
broader community and social concerns in their organizing and contract campaigns.
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Summary
The title of this essay, and the subtitle of the preceding section are more than an
observation about patterns in academic labor organizing. They are also a suggestion to
management, at the institutional, system, statewide, and national levels to learn from, emulate,
and work in concert with academic labor in forming common cause. Academic capitalism, and
its corollaries of disaster and disastrous academic capitalism have been a dominant policy regime
for four decades. They are playing themselves out in an ongoing, downward spiral of public
disinvestment in concert with the academy’s privatized practices and efforts, at which many if
not most institutions have failed to succeed. The result compromises possibilities for employees
and students in higher education, and for our contributions to the broader communities we are
supposed to be serving.
Now is the time to re-think, re-envision, and re-structure the priorities and strategic
practices of colleges and universities to a more progressive new normal of working in coalition
with employees and communities to advance wall-to-wall benefits of higher education for all. I
have laid out in the preceding section what that means for academic labor. For academic
management, what that means is expanding their articulation of fiduciary responsibility and
vision beyond the boundaries of “their” institutions, which in fact are not theirs, but for which
they have a stewardship role in relation to broader communities. It means framing strategic
actions and initiatives not to get “buy-in” from various groups within (and beyond) the
organization, but as partners in defining new possibilities that center and serve the academy’s
public responsibilities, and given its history of systemic inequity and participation in patterns of
oppression and exploitation, defining success in ways centered in better serving underserved
communities.
The above sort of project is one around which labor and management could form common
cause. In doing so, they could imagine, leverage, and successfully work towards a much needed,
fuller re-investment in not-for-profit higher education. The aim would be not simply to make it
more affordable and in some schemes free for students (who in the neoliberal mindset are
consumers). For it is not free to provide higher education. The aim would also be necessarily to
make higher education a safer, better, more supportive workplace for all employees, wall-towall, and a fuller contributor to the communities we serve. Because, to play on/modify a
longtime mantra of the contingent faculty labor movement, employees’ working conditions are
students learning/living conditions, and communities’ public (and private) benefit. It is time to
move beyond disaster, disastrous academic capitalism, and its ongoing false/forced austerity. It is
time, as well, to move beyond the preceding old normal, and its ongoing systemic inequities. It is
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time to work in coalition, wall-to-wall, and beyond the academy’s walls towards a progressive
new normal.
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